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Armstrong, Banerjee and Corona (2013) find that investors' perception of 
factor loading is uncertain and higher uncertainty is associated with lower 
expected stock returns. In this paper, we hypothesize and document that firms 
with worse accounting quality have higher factor loading uncertainty. Such a 
finding is robust across pooled sample analysis, firm fixed effects analysis, 
Fama-Macbeth estimation, and quasi-experiments utilizing financial 
restatements and firms’ disclosures of their internal control weakness. The 
effect appears to be more pronounced in firms with worse information 
environment. In addition, innate accounting quality has a larger explanatory 
power compared with discretionary accounting quality. Employing path 
analysis methodology, we find that worse accounting quality is associated with 
lower stock returns through the channel of factor loading uncertainty. Such an 
effect dominates the positive stock return effect through beta. Collectively, our 
study suggests a new channel through which accounting quality can affect 
expected stock returns. Such a link has not been incorporated in prior studies, 
and helps explain the mixed evidence on the association between accounting 
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The relationship between accounting quality and expected stock returns 
has received intense attention from academic researchers (Francis, Lafond, 
Olsson and Schipper, 2005; Core, Guay and Verdi, 2008; Brousseau and Gu, 
2012). Francis, Lafond, Olsson and Schipper (2005) suggest that worse 
accounting quality implies higher information risk, and as such, is associated 
with higher expected returns.
1
 Core, Guay and Verdi (2008) take issue with 
Francis, Lafond, Olsson and Schipper (2005) in their empirical methodology. 
Utilizing standard asset pricing specifications, they find that accounting 
quality is not a priced risk factor. In a recent study, Brousseau and Gu (2012) 
show that, opposite to the results in Francis, Lafond, Olsson and Schipper 
(2005), worse accounting quality is associated with lower expected stock 
returns for the majority of stocks (except the smallest quintile). 
Resolving the mixed evidence in the aforementioned studies requires a 
better understanding of the channels through which accounting quality can 
affect expected stock returns. In a traditional asset pricing framework, 
accounting quality is either treated as a risk itself (Easley and O’Hara, 2004) 
or viewed as being related to other risks (e.g. the CAPM beta as suggested in 
Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2007). Under both frameworks, worse 
accounting quality is expected to be associated with higher expected stock 
returns. However, empirical evidence has not been consistently supportive and 
has provided only limited credence to the conceptual framework. It thus 
                                                          
1
 Information risk is defined as the likelihood that the information which is useful for investors’ 
decision making is of low quality. 
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becomes interesting whether there is any link that prior research has omitted 
between accounting quality and expected stock returns. 
In this study, we build on recent theoretical development in the asset 
pricing literature and suggest a new channel through which worse accounting 
quality can lead to lower expected stock returns – factor loading uncertainty. 
Armstrong, Banerjee and Corona (2013) develop a dynamic partial 
equilibrium model in which factor loading (log-CAPM beta) is time-varying, 
and investors engage in a learning process of the factor loading. They show 
that when factor loading is perceived to be uncertain, current stock prices are 
higher and future returns will be lower. By itself, factor loading uncertainty 
measures the dispersion of the factor loading level perceived by investors. For 
example, in one case, investors know with certainty that a firm has a beta that 
equals one; whereas, in the other case, investors know that there is 50% 
probability a firm has a beta that equals 0.5 and a remaining 50% probability 
that it equals 1.5. It is defined that investors have higher factor loading 
uncertainty in the latter case than they do in the former case. 
In regards to the economic intuition on how factor loading uncertainty 
affects stock returns, it relies on the feature that the pricing kernel (or 
stochastic discount factor) is a convex function of the state of nature. With a 
certain future cash flow of a firm, the state of nature associated with it is 
known for sure when loading is certain. However, uncertainty in factor loading 
implies that the state of nature associated with the stream of future cash flow 
could be either better or worse. The key difference that it makes is that the 
increase in the pricing kernel in the worse state is larger than the decrease in 
the pricing kernel in the better state, resulting in a net increase of the utility of 
  3 
 
the associated cash flow on average. As such, factor loading uncertainty 
increases current stock prices and lowers expected stock returns.
2
 We illustrate 
this intuition and the resulting prediction through a simplified Gordon growth 
model in Appendix 1. 
We hypothesize that worse accounting quality increases investors’ 
perceived uncertainty about factor loading. To measure a firm’s accounting 
quality, we employ the construct stemming from Dechow and Dichev (2002), 
consistent with prior literature. Such a construct measures the extent to which 
a firm’s accruals are mapped to previous, current and future cash flows. We 
argue that, when accounting information is of lower quality, investors’ 
projection of future cash flow contains more noise which further manifests in a 
larger dispersion over the estimated covariance between cash flows and the 
states of nature, i.e., a firm’s risk factor loading. Using the (log)-CAPM as our 
baseline asset pricing model (Armstrong, Banerjee and Corona, 2013), we find 
consistent results in that worse accounting quality is associated with higher 
uncertainty about the (log)-CAPM beta. The results are robust across 
alternative specifications, including pooled sample multivariate analysis, firm 
fixed effects analysis, and Fama-Macbeth estimation. We also find results that 
are qualitatively the same when we use alternative measures of accounting 
quality and different underlying asset pricing models to estimate factor loading 
uncertainty. 
In addition to the pooled sample effect, we find that the association 
between accounting quality and factor loading uncertainty becomes more 
                                                          
2
 Armstrong, Corona and Banerjee (2013) provide an illustrative numeric example when 
explaining how higher factor loading uncertainty leads to lower expected stock returns on p. 
159. 
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pronounced for firms with worse information environments, and thus rely 
more on their financial reporting, i.e., firms that are smaller, have more growth 
opportunities, larger fundamental volatility, and higher analyst forecast 
dispersion. Furthermore, when we decompose accounting quality into an 
innate part determined by a firm’s operating environment and business model, 
and a discretionary part determined by managerial choices, we find that the 
former has a larger effect on factor loading uncertainty compared with the 
latter. 
To measure accounting quality with more validity, and also to draw a 
causal inference on how accounting quality affects factor loading uncertainty, 
we utilize two quasi-experiments: (1) financial restatements; and (2) firms’ 
disclosures of their internal control weakness. Financial restatements are 
significant events revealing to investors firms’ previous financial reporting 
misconduct. Not only do they objectively identify firms with reporting 
problems, restatement announcements also significantly revise investors’ 
beliefs about the firms’ information quality (Graham, Li and Qiu, 2008; 
Scholz, 2008; Chen, Cheng and Lo, 2013). Applying a difference-in-
differences research design, we show that factor loading uncertainty of the 
restating firm, relative to that of the non-restating control firm, is significantly 
higher in the year following the restatement than in the year prior to it. This 
evidence lends further support to our argument that accounting quality has a 
negative effect on factor loading uncertainty. 
Further, the inefficiency in a firm's internal control system signals to the 
capital market that the firm is prone to financial reporting inadequateness. We 
rely on the setting in which a firm discloses internal control weakness and 
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following remediation to conduct supplemental analyses. We find that firms 
experience an increase in factor loading uncertainty after they disclose internal 
control weakness. However, such an increase disappears once firms have 
remedied the ineffectiveness in their internal control system. 
Finally, we extend the analyses to stock return implications of the link 
between accounting quality and factor loading uncertainty. While it is 
important to establish a clear-cut unconditional relationship between 
accounting quality and expected stock return, that is not the aim of this study. 
What we are attempting to show is that factor loading uncertainty represents 
one important channel that helps explain the return difference between firms 
with different accounting quality.  
We conduct path analysis to understand how accounting quality affects 
expected stock returns through different channels. Such a methodology 
originates from marketing and psychology research and has recently begun to 
be adopted in accounting research (e.g., Bushee and Noe, 2000; Bhattacharya, 
Ecker, Olsson and Schipper, 2012). We incorporate two channels/mediators 
through which accounting quality can affect expected stock returns: 1) factor 
loading uncertainty; and 2) CAPM beta. Empirical evidence reveals that worse 
accounting quality leads to significantly lower stock returns through higher 
factor loading uncertainty. Such an effect dominates the effect of a lower 
CAPM beta which, interestingly, does not have significant explanatory power 
on stock return itself. Further, there also exists a residual/direct effect left 
unexplained by these two channels, also suggesting that firms with worse 
accounting quality have lower expected stock returns. Our results thus present 
a challenge to the previous theoretical proposition that worse accounting 
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quality is unconditionally associated with higher expected return (Easley and 
O’Hara, 2004; Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2007). However, it is consistent 
with more recent theoretical work (Armstrong, Banerjee and Corona, 2013) 
and many existing empirical regularities (Lee and Swaminathan, 2000; Diether, 
Malloy and Scherbina, 2002; Jiang, Lee and Zhang, 2005; Zhang, 2006; 
Brousseau and Gu, 2012). 
Our study makes the following contributions. First, we add to the current 
literature on the relationship between accounting quality and expected stock 
returns. The debate spurred by Francis, Lafond, Olsson and Schipper (2005) 
largely focuses on two issues. One is whether accounting quality is a priced 
risk factor; whereas, the other is how accounting quality affects expected stock 
returns. We show that, even though accounting quality is not a priced risk 
factor (Core, Guay and Verdi, 2008), it can still affect expected stock returns 
when investors are uncertain about the factor loadings. More importantly, such 
a channel implies a return effect that is opposite to the predictions in previous 
theoretical work (Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2007), but consistent with recent empirical evidence (Brousseau and Gu, 
2012).  
Second, we show an important determinant of factor loading uncertainty. 
Armstrong, Banerjee and Corona (2013) propose a theoretical development 
regarding the traditional asset pricing model (e.g. log-CAPM). Specifically, 
they relax the assumption that factor loading is known with certainty. 
Incorporating such an extension, they show that firms with more loading 
uncertainty have significantly higher share prices and lower stock returns. 
Although both the theoretical and empirical evidence are of significant interest 
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to us, little is known about the determinants of factor loading uncertainty. We 
show that accounting quality is negatively associated with firms’ factor 
loading uncertainty. To put the effect into a return perspective, a change of one 
standard deviation of our accounting quality measure has an effect on factor 
loading uncertainty which could be further translated into 55 basis points of 
stock return per year. 
The balance of our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss 
relevant literature and establish the main hypothesis. Section 3 describes the 
sample selection and our empirical construction of key measures. We discuss 
empirical analyses in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature and hypotheses development 
2.1 Accounting quality and expected stock returns 
How information risk affects expected stock returns has received 
significant attention from both theoretical and empirical research (e.g., Easley 
and O’Hara, 2004; Francis, Lafond, Olsson and Schipper, 2005; Hughes, Liu 
and Liu, 2007; Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2007; Core, Guay and Verdi, 
2008; Brousseau and Gu, 2012). However, the conclusion remains mixed. In 
the traditional asset pricing framework, such as the CAPM model, there is no 
role for information risk to affect equity premium, as it is perceived to be 
diversifiable. However, Easley and O’Hara (2004) suggest that, for firms with 
less public information and more private information, there is higher 
information risk and hence higher expected return. Lambert, Leuz and 
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Verrecchia (2007) extend the theoretical model and suggest that information 
quality could affect expected returns through covariances (e.g., CAPM beta). 
In a related work, Hughes, Liu and Liu (2007) propose that, aside from 
existing risk premiums, information risk does not have any effect on expected 
stock returns once researchers control for systematic risk. 
The debate on how accounting quality affects expected stock returns is 
also intense in empirical studies. Francis, Lafond, Olsson and Schipper (2005) 
find that worse accounting quality is associated with both higher cost of equity 
and higher cost of debt. They interpret their results as evidence supporting the 
pricing of information risk. Core, Guay and Verdi (2008) take issue with 
Francis, Lafond, Olsson and Schipper (2005) in the empirical methodology. 
They employed standard asset pricing tests and suggest that information risk is 
not priced in the stock returns. In a recent work, Brousseau and Gu (2012) 
show that, precisely opposite to the conclusion in Francis, Lafond, Olsson and 
Schipper (2005), worse accounting quality is associated with lower future 
returns for the majority of firms. The mixed theoretical arguments and 
empirical evidence lead one to wonder whether we have missed some 
important links between accounting quality and stock returns. This study aims 
to address such an issue in that we investigate whether accounting is related to 
factor loading uncertainty which further affects expected stock returns. 
2.2 Factor loading uncertainty 
By definition, risk factor loading measures the covariance between a firm’s 
cash flow and the state of nature. Armstrong, Banerjee and Corona (2013) 
depart from the standard set-up and incorporate the possibility that risk factor 
  9 
 
loading could be uncertain ex ante. Under such a scenario, current share prices 
increase and expected stock returns decrease. The underlying rationale is that 
the present value of future cash flows is a convex function of factor loading. 
As such, the impact of a decrease in factor loading is larger than the impact of 
an equivalent increase in factor loading, resulting in a net effect that is higher 
than the present value in the case of a certain factor loading. Our Appendix 1 
illustrates this intuition by a simple model. Armstrong, Banerjee and Corona 
(2013) show that firms’ expected stock returns decrease in factor loading 
uncertainty after controlling for the average level of loadings.  
We argue that a firm’s financial reporting quality (or accounting quality) 
can have a significant impact on its factor loading uncertainty. Although not 
directly affecting firms’ real cash flows, financial reports serve as a firm’s key 
information source whose quality can significantly change market participants’ 
assessments regarding the distribution of a firm’s future cash flows (Lambert, 
Leuz and Verrecchia, 2007). In projecting future cash flows, investors rely on, 
either completely or incompletely, a firm’s accounting information which 
maps accruals to cash flows. Although earnings are good indicators of future 
cash flows (Dechow, 1994), the accrual component of earnings is largely 
affected by managerial judgment, discretion and opportunism, and thereby 
subject to greater uncertainty (Francis, Lafond, Olsson and Schipper, 2005). 
As such, poorer accounting quality reduces the precision of investors’ 
projection of a firm’s future cash flows. Moreover, more noise in projected 
cash flows will also manifest in a more dispersed estimate of the covariance 
between future cash flow and the state of nature. Appendix 2 provides a 
statistical illustration of the latter point. 
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Building upon the newly developed theory on factor loading uncertainty, it 
thus becomes interesting to revisit the association between accounting quality 
and expected stock returns because prior literature predominantly assumes 
certain factor loadings and considers only the level of loadings to play a role in 
determining expected stock returns. Does accounting quality affect perceived 
factor loading uncertainty? If so, does the role of factor loading uncertainty 
help explain previous mixed evidence in the association between accounting 
quality and future stock returns? Our study tries to shed some light on these 
questions. 
 
3. Sample formation and variable construction 
3.1 Sample formation 
Our sample consists of the intersection of COMPUSTAT and CRSP from 
1971 to 2011.  Stock return information is obtained from CRSP and firm 
fundamentals are collected from COMPUSTAT.  We exclude firms in the 
financial industry (SIC Code 6000-6999) and those in the utility industry (SIC 
Code 4900-4999).  Furthermore, we require non-missing values for variables 
used to estimate accounting quality and factor loading uncertainty, and for all 
control variables.  Our main empirical sample consists of 101,283 firm-year 
observations.  Sample size may vary for different analyses due to additional 
data requirements.   
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3.2 Accounting quality measure 
Consistent with prior literature (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Francis, 
Lafond, Olsson and Schipper, 2005; Core, Guay and Verdi, 2008), we measure 
accounting quality (AQ) by running a regression of total current accruals on 
lagged, current, and future cash flows, along with the change in revenue and 
property, plant, and equipment. The regression model is depicted in Eq. (1): 
TCAit=a0+a1CFOit-1+a2CFOit+a3CFOit+1+ a4⊿REVit+ a5PPEit+µit,        (1) 
where TCA is the total current accruals, calculated as ⊿CA-⊿CL-
⊿CASH+⊿STDEBT; ⊿CA is the change in current assets; ⊿CL is the change in 
current liabilities; ⊿CASH is the change in cash; ⊿STDEBT is the change in 
the debt in current liabilities; CFO is the cash flow from operations, 
constructed as net income before extra-ordinary items minus total accrual plus 
the depreciation and amortization expense; ⊿REV is the change in revenue; 
and PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment. All variables are deflated by 
average total assets.  Subscripts i and t denote firm and year, respectively. 
Eq. (1) is estimated for each industry-year with at least 20 firms. Industries 
are defined according to the Fama and French’s 48 industries classification.  
Our measure of accounting quality for firm i in year t equals the standard 
deviation of the residuals for firm i in the five years’ period t-4 ~ t, multiplied 
by minus one, i.e., AQit=Std(µit). As such, a higher value of AQ indicates 
higher quality of accounting information.   
In robustness analyses, we repeat our empirical investigation with 
alternative measures of accounting quality, i.e., the discretionary accrual 
quality measures estimated from the modified Jones model and the 
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performance-matched accrual model (Kothari, Leone and Wasley, 2005). To 
further address measurement and causality concerns, we also conduct analyses 
utilizing the settings of financial restatements and internal control weakness 
disclosure. We provide details of these tests in later sections. 
3.3 Measuring factor loading uncertainty 
Conceptually, a firm’s factor loading uncertainty measures the dispersion 
that investors perceive in the covariance between its future cash flows and the 
state of nature, none of which, however, is directly measurable for researchers. 
As it is difficult to capture high frequency observations of a firm’s cash flows, 
Armstrong, Banerjee and Corona (2013) suggest using the (log)-CAPM as a 
benchmark pricing model for empirical estimation of loading uncertainty.  
Specifically, for a given firm-year, we estimate the factor loading level and the 
loading uncertainty by running a regression of the excess (log) monthly return 
of stock i on the monthly excess return on the market over a rolling window of 
60 months, as specified in Eq. (2) below: 
ri,t+1 – rf,t = ai + bi(rm,t+1 - rf,t) + ei,t+1,                                                       (2) 
where ri,t+1 and rm,t+1 are monthly log returns on stock i and the market, 
respectively; rf,t is the log risk free rate; and ei,t+1 is the error term. Following 
Armstrong, Banerjee and Corona (2013), we construct our proxy for factor 
loading uncertainty as the squared term of the standard error of bi estimate, i.e., 
BETA_VARi = (std err(bi))
2
. A higher value of BETA_VAR indicates greater 
factor loading uncertainty perceived by investors, and vice versa.  
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4. Empirical analyses 
In this section, we describe our empirical analyses. We mainly aim to 
answer two empirical questions. First, we examine whether a firm’s 
accounting quality affects its factor loading uncertainty in Sections 4.1— 4.6. 
Second, we analyze whether accounting quality affects expected returns 
through factor loading uncertainty in Section 4.7. We also provide 
supplemental robustness analyses in Section 4.8. 
4.1 Summary statistics and correlations 
Summary statistics of key variables are presented in Table 1 Panel A. Our 
empirical sample has in total 101,283 firm-year observations over 1971 to 
2011. The accounting quality measure, AQ, has a mean value of -0.05, similar 
to the one reported in Francis, Lafond, Olsson and Schipper (2005).
3
 Its 
standard deviation is 0.043. Our loading uncertainty measure, BETA_VAR, has 
a mean value of 0.222 and a standard deviation of 0.326. The average firm has 
a (log)-CAPM beta of 1.192, a market to book ratio at 2.334, a ratio of long 
term debt to total assets at 0.168 and a return on asset at -0.5%. 
In terms of correlations, we mainly focus on how accounting quality (AQ) 
and factor loading uncertainty (BETA_VAR) are correlated with other factors. 
We report Pearson correlations among key variables in Table 1 Panel B. The 
correlation between AQ and BETA_VAR is estimated to be -0.40, and is 
consistent with our hypothesis that better accounting quality is associated with 
lower factor loading uncertainty. AQ is also negatively associated with BETA, 
suggesting that firms with higher accounting quality have lower systematic 
                                                          
3
 As we multiply the standard deviation of residual accruals by minus one, our accounting 
quality measure has the opposite sign compared with the measure used in Francis, Lafond, 
Olsson and Schipper (2005). 
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risk, consistent with the evidence shown in Ng (2011). In terms of other firm 
characteristics, accounting quality is found to be better for larger firms, higher 
leverage firms and more profitable firms. In contrast, it is lower for growth 
firms and firms with more fundamental volatilities. As for factor loading 
uncertainty, we find that it is higher for growth firms and firms with more 
fundamental volatilities while it is lower for large firms, firms with high 
leverage and more profitability. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
4.2 Accounting quality and factor loading uncertainty – average effect 
In this section, we conduct baseline regression analyses on the association 
between accounting quality and factor loading uncertainty. We estimate the 
regression using alternative specifications including pooled sample OLS 
regression, firm fixed effects analysis and Fama-Macbeth estimation. Due to 
limited theoretical guidance on what affects loading uncertainty, our choice of 
independent variables is naturally ad hoc. As a consequence, we rely on 
economic intuition derived from prior studies to guide our selection. Our 
pooled sample OLS regression model is depicted by Eq. (3): 
BETA_VARi,t+1 = a0 + a1AQi,t + a2LOGMCAPi,t + a3MTBi,t + a4LEVi,t  
                            + a5ROAi,t + a6STDROAi,t + Industry Effects  
                            + Year Effects + ei,t+1,                                                  (3) 
 
where we include the following vector of covariates: firm size (LOGMCAP); 
market to book ratio (MTB); firm leverage (LEV); operating profitability 
(ROA); and earnings volatility (STDROA).  Detailed variable definitions are 
outlined in Appendix 3. All independent variables on the right hand side of Eq. 
(3) have their values taken at the last fiscal year ending date before calendar 
year t+1.  We include fixed effects for year and industry. Industries are defined 
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according to the Fama-French 48 classification scheme. The t-statistics are 
based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the 
firm level. 
We report estimation results in Table 2 Panel A. Results depict a negative 
and significant association between accounting quality and factor loading 
uncertainty (-0.9152, t = -14.00). In economic terms, one standard deviation 
increase in accounting quality of a median sample firm is associated with a 32% 
reduction in factor loading uncertainty.
4
 This suggests that the effect of 
accounting information is not only statistically significant, but also 
economically impactful. 
As for control variables, the negative and significant coefficients on 
LOGMCAP and ROA indicate that larger or more profitable firms have lower 
loading uncertainty. Differently, firms with higher growth potential (MTB) or 
more volatile operating performance (STDROA) tend to have greater loading 
uncertainty. 
We then establish the robustness of our baseline results employing two 
alternative estimation methods: firm fixed effects analysis and Fama-Macbeth 
estimation. In firm fixed effects analysis, we replace industry fixed effects 
with firm effects in Eq. (3). As such, we are investigating the association 
between with-in firm variations of factor loading uncertainty and accounting 
quality. Panel B, Column (1) shows that results under this specification are 
qualitatively similar to those in Panel A (-0.5628, t = -7.99). A smaller (in 
magnitude) coefficient is expected because cross-sectional variation is 
absorbed. 
                                                          
4
 0.043*(-0.9152)/0.123=-0.32.  See Table 1-A for descriptive statistics used in this calculation.   
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In terms of the Fama-Macbeth estimation, we exclude year effects from Eq. 
(3) as each year serves as a cross-section. We then estimate the regression 
each year and construct the mean value of the times-series of each coefficient 
estimate. We report t-statistics based on Newey-West standard errors. Results 
are presented in Table 2 Panel B. The negative association between accounting 
quality and factor loading uncertainty is again confirmed (-0.7815, t = -7.19). 
In brief, empirical analyses here consistently support our hypothesis that worse 
accounting quality is associated with higher factor loading uncertainty. 
 [Insert Table 2 Here] 
4.3 Effect of accounting quality on loading uncertainty conditional on firm 
characteristics 
In this section, we build on our evidence above and investigate the 
conditional effect of firm characteristics on the association between 
accounting quality and factor loading uncertainty. We hypothesize that the 
effect of accounting quality on factor loading uncertainty is larger for small 
firms who have relatively less other information sources, for firms with more 
growth opportunities and more earnings volatilities as they have more 
uncertainties, and for firms with higher analyst forecast dispersion since 
analysts represent a significant information intermediary to reduce information 
asymmetry between the firm and investors. 
In regard to the empirical specification, we create following indicators. 
DSIZE equals one for firm-years with LOGMCAP larger than its yearly 
median and zero otherwise. DMTB equals one for firm-years with MTB larger 
than its yearly median and zero otherwise. DSTDROA equals one for firm-
years with STDROA larger than its yearly median and zero otherwise. DDISP 
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equals one for firm-years with analyst forecast dispersion that is larger than its 
yearly median and zero otherwise. We define DISP as the standard deviation 
of analyst forecasts of a firm’s annual earnings, deflated by share price at the 
fiscal year end. We then add to the right hand side of Eq. (3) an interaction 
term of AQ with one of the indicators above. Note that the regression 
including DDISP has a smaller number of observations as analyst forecasts 
data are not available in early years in the sample period. 
Results are presented in Table 3. We find evidence that is consistent with 
our expectations. Specifically, the coefficient on AQ*DSIZE is positive and 
significant (0.3347, t = 4.73), suggesting that the negative association between 
accounting quality and factor loading uncertainty is attenuated for large firms. 
The coefficient on AQ*DMTB is negative and significant (-0.5366, t = -8.56), 
consistent with the argument that the effect of accounting quality on factor 
loading uncertainty is stronger for growth firms. In addition, the coefficient on 
AQ*DSTDROA is negative and significant (-0.8060, t = -12.49). Results 
confirm the expectation that for firms with higher fundamental uncertainties, 
the effect of accounting quality is more pronounced. Finally, the coefficient on 
AQ*DDISP is negative and significant (-0.1503, t = -1.74). Such a result 
supports the assertion that, in firms with worse information environment, 
investors rely more on accounting information to make investment decisions. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
4.4 Innate versus discretionary accounting quality 
In our second set of conditional analyses, we incorporate the possibility 
that different components of accounting quality may have different 
implications for the firm’s factor loading uncertainty. To be more precise, we 
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follow Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper (2005) and Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) to decompose a firm’s accounting quality into an innate component and 
a discretionary component. The innate component is largely determined by the 
firm’s business model and operating environment. As for the discretionary 
component, Guay, Kothari and Watts (1996) propose that it is consisting of 
performance measurement, managerial opportunism and noise. The 
performance measurement subcomponent, argued by Guay, Kothari and Watts 
(1996) to be able to enhance earnings as a performance indicator, serves to 
reduce information uncertainty while managerial opportunism and noise 
subcomponents mainly increase information uncertainty. Such an offsetting 
effect leads us to predict that the factor loading uncertainty effect of 
discretionary accounting quality is less pronounced than the effect of innate 
accounting quality. 
To estimate the innate and discretionary components of accounting quality, 
we select a list of innate factors suggested in prior studies (Dechow and 
Dichev, 2002; Francis, Lafond, Olsson and Schipper, 2005), and include them 
as independent variables in the following annual regression: 
AQi,t = a0 + a1*LOGATi,t + a2*STDCFOi,t + a3*STDSALEi,t  
            + a4*OPCyclei,t + a5*LOSSi,t + εi,t;                                              (4) 
 
where LOGAT is the natural log of a firm’s total assets; STDCFO is the 
standard deviation of a firm’s cash flow from operations during the previous 
10 years; STDSALE is the standard deviation of a firm’s sales during the 
previous 10 years; and OPCycle measures the length of operating cycle, which 
is defined as 360/(Sale/Average Account Receivable) + 360/(Cost of Goods 
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Sold/Average Inventory). Finally, LOSS is defined as the proportion of annual 
earnings that are negative in the previous 10 years. 
We define a firm’s innate accounting quality (AQ_INNATE) as the 
predicted value from Eq. (4), and treat the regression residual as the firm’s 
discretionary portion of its accounting quality (AQ_DISC). To examine the 
factor loading uncertainty effects of both components, we replace the AQ 
variable in Eq. (3) with AQ_INNATE  and AQ_DISC, and then run a regression 
of Eq. (5) below: 
BETA_VARi,t+1 = a0 + a1AQ_INNATEi,t + a2AQ_DISCi,t + a3LOGMCAPi,t 
                            + a4MTBi,t + a5LEVi,t + a6ROAi,t + a7STDROAi,t 
                            + Industry Effects + Year Effects + ei,t+1,                        (5) 
                             
Alternatively, we estimate the above regression model using decile ranks 
of both components AQRANK_INNATE and AQRANK_DISC, taking integer 
values ranging from 0 to 9. A higher rank indicates better accounting quality. 
Such a procedure mitigates the concern that the two accounting quality 
components are of different scale, therefore rendering the coefficients on them 
not comparable.     
Results are presented in Table 4.  As shown in Column (1) where we use 
raw measures of two accounting quality components, the coefficients on 
AQ_INNATE and AQ_DISC equal -3.2847 (t=-15.81) and -0.5756 (t=-7.25), 
respectively. The finding suggests that higher accounting quality of both 
components is associated with lower factor loading uncertainty.  Moreover, F-
test for the difference in the two coefficient estimates reveals that the effect of 
innate accounting quality on factor loading uncertainty is significantly larger 
in magnitude than the one of discretionary accounting quality.  
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Column (2) show results based on decile ranks of two accounting quality 
components. Consistent with the finding in Column (1), the coefficients on 
both accrual components are negative and significant (-0.0211, t=-21.43 on 
AQRANK_INNATE; -0.0028, t=-5.40 on AQRANK_DISC), and the effect of 
the innate component is again significantly larger in magnitude. Collectively, 
our results support the conjecture that innate accounting quality determined by 
a firm’s business model and operating environment has a more pronounced 
factor loading uncertainty effect than discretionary accounting quality 
determined by performance measurement, managerial opportunism and noise. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
4.5 Evidence from financial restatements 
In the analyses above, we rely on the accounting quality measure from 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) to conduct empirical analyses. Such a measure has 
also been employed in prior studies (e.g. Francis, Lafond, Olsson and Schipper, 
2005; Core, Guay and Verdi, 2008; and Brosseau and Gu, 2012). However, the 
application is also accompanied with critique over its construct validity and 
measurement errors/biases. To provide corroborative evidence, we analyze the 
change in factor loading uncertainty around financial restatements. Since a 
financial restatement is a confirmation of a firm’s previous accounting 
misconduct, it is a clear indicator of accounting quality deterioration (Dechow, 
Ge and Schrand, 2010). In addition, a firm’s restatement announcement is an 
event that triggers investors to re-assess the quality of the firm’s accounting 
information (Kravet and Shevlin, 2010), thus providing us with a setting to 
make a causal inference on the consequences of accounting quality change 
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(Chen, Cheng and Lo, 2013). We attempt to examine whether factor loading 
uncertainty increases after a firm announces a financial restatement. 
We begin with collecting an initial sample of financial restatements from 
the 2003 GAO report and its updates issued in 2006. The initial sample is 
further merged to CRSP and COMPUSTAT due to additional data 
requirements of stock returns to estimate loading uncertainty, and of 
accounting variables. Furthermore, to facilitate a difference-in differences 
regression, we construct a  sample of matched control firms. In particular, for 
each restating firm, we match it with a non-restating firm in the same Fama-
French 48 industry and with the closest market cap at the end of the month 
prior to the restatement announcement. Our final restatement sample consists 
of 1,030 restatement firms and 1,030 control firms from 1997 to 2006. 
We then estimate the factor loading uncertainty for both the restating firms 
and the control firms over a 12-month period before the restatement month 
(Year -1) and after it (Year 1), respectively. Due to the limited number of 
monthly return observations, we also use daily returns to construct our factor 
loading uncertainty in robustness analyses. Untabulated results suggest that 
our conclusions remain qualitatively the same. 
Table 5, Panel A presents univariate test results. Several observations 
emerge. Average factor loading uncertainty (2.4436) for the restating firms 
after the restatement is significantly higher than the one before the restatement 
(1.7761). The difference in the mean values (dif=0.6675, t=4.81) is significant 
at the 1% level. The mean factor loading uncertainty of control firms after the 
restatement equals 1.7681, and the one before the restatement equals 1.5282, 
with the difference being also statistically significant (dif.= 0.2399, t=2.10). 
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Such a result for control firms can be due to a spill-over effect, whereby the 
restating firm’s announcement also affects investors’ perceptions of its peer 
firms in the same industry. We then compute the change in factor loading 
uncertainty of both groups of firms, around the financial restatements. Results 
suggest that, compared with control firms, restatement firms experience a 
significant increase in their perceived factor loading uncertainty (0.4276, t = 
2.38). 
Thereafter, we conduct multivariate regression analyses to add further 
control. In particular, we employ a difference-in-differences (DID) estimation 
to investigate the impact of financial restatements on firms’ factor loading 
uncertainty. First, we estimate a traditional DID regression illustrated by Eq. 
(6): 
BETA_VARi,t+1 = a0 + a1POSTi,t + a2RESTATEi,t + a3POST*RESTATEi,t  
                         + a4LOGMCAPi,t + a5MTBi,t + a6LEVi,t + a7ROAi,t  
                         + a8STDROAi,t+ Industry Effects + Year Effects + ei,t+1,   (6) 
 
where RESTATE is an indicator that equals one for a restatement firm, and 
zero otherwise; and POST is an indicator that equals one for the post-
restatement year, for both the restatement firm and the control firm, and zero 
otherwise. The interaction term POST*RESTATE thus captures the change in 
factor loading uncertainty of restatement firms, compared with the change of 
control firms. We also include previously introduced determinants of a firm’s 
factor loading uncertainty. Their definitions appear in Appendix 3. We report 
the regression results in Table 5, Panel B. The coefficient on POST*RESTATE 
in Column (1) is positive and significant (0.5755, t = 3.91), suggesting that the 
factor loading uncertainty of restatement firms significantly increases 
compared with that of control firms. 
  23 
 
One unique feature of the setting of financial restatements is that firms 
receive the treatment (the restatement announcement) at different time points. 
It thus differs from settings, such as IFRS adoption, in which firms experience 
the event in the same time period. Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) 
suggest a more stringent DID model for staggering adoptions (or staggering 
treatments), such as U.S. companies’ adoption of anti-takeover laws in the 
1990s and financial restatements in our setting, to further control any potential 
bias stemming from the different restatement time. Specifically, they specify a 
regression model incorporating indicators for firm and year, and a separate 
indicator for treatment firms’ post-event era as the variable of interest. Applied 
in our context, the following model should be estimated: 
BETA_VARi,t+1 = αi + αt + a1POST*RESTATEi,t + a2LOGMCAPi,t  
                          + a3MTBi,t + a4LEVi,t + a5ROAi,t + a6STDROAi,t 
                          + Industry Effects + ei,t+1,                                                  (7) 
 
where αi and αt are indicators for each firm and year, respectively. 
POST*RESTATE remains to be our variable of interest. We estimate this 
alternative specification and report the results in Column (2). We find that the 
coefficient on POST*RESTATE is again positive and significant (0.6335, t = 
3.93), lending further support to our assertion that financial restatements result 
in an significant increase in the factor loading uncertainty of the restatement 
firms. 
Empirical evidence here supports the argument that financial restatements 
result in a significant increase in the factor loading uncertainty of restating 
firms. Such a result thus complements our previous empirical evidence using 
cross-sectional analysis and confirms a negative association between 
accounting quality and factor loading uncertainty. However, care should be 
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taken when it comes to the interpretation of the pricing and return effects. 
Financial restatements can affect share prices through both cash flow and 
information uncertainty channels. The former is an expectation of diminished 
company prospects and expected future litigation costs, and thus can 
significantly reduce future cash flows (Palmrose and Scholz, 2004; Palmrose, 
Richardson and Scholz, 2004; Wilson, 2008). The latter includes the effect of 
factor loading uncertainty, along with other effects, such as increased 
systematic risk. While a higher factor loading uncertainty implies a higher 
share price, as illustrated in Armstrong, Banerjee and Corona (2013), other 
channels, such as a negative shock to expected cash flow and an increase in 
systematic risk, generate an opposite effect which presumably can dominate 
the loading uncertainty effect. As such, existing empirical evidence suggests a 
negative abnormal stock return around a firm’s announcement of financial 
restatements (Palmrose and Scholz, 2004; Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz, 
2004; Chen, Cheng and Lo, 2013). 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
4.6 Internal control weakness and factor loading uncertainty 
4.6.1 Factor loading uncertainty around the disclosure of internal control 
weakness 
While financial restatements represent clear indicators that a firm’s 
financial reporting has been of inadequate quality before the restatement, 
empirical analysis relies on the assumption that, even though restatements are 
accompanied by corrected financial numbers, investors’ perception of a firm’s 
financial reporting will experience a downward revision around the event. In 
this section, we utilize another setting in which such an assumption is not 
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necessary. In particular, we look into a firm’s announcement of its internal 
control weakness and the following remediation. 
A firm’s internal control weakness (ICW) signals to outsiders that the firm 
is more likely to have financial reporting errors compared with firms with 
effective internal control processes. In particular, ICW firms can be exposed to 
either intentional or unintentional misreporting. The inadequateness of policies, 
training and diligence of a firm’s employees can potentially lead to 
unintentional reporting errors. In addition, ineffective internal control also 
increases latitudes for managers to exercise their accounting discretion and 
introduce intentional disclosure fraud. Empirical evidence has been ample 
supporting the argument that investors perceive ICW firms to have less precise 
and reliable financial reporting information. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney 
and Lafond (2009) show that internal control deficiencies are associated with 
higher idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk, ultimately resulting in a higher 
cost of capital. Dhaliwal, Hogan, Trezevant and Wilkins (2011) find that a 
firm’s credit spread increases after it announces internal control weakness. 
Further, the disclosure of the following remediation provides a clear signal 
to the market that any potential weakness in financial reporting has been cured. 
Such an event provides us with an opportunity to examine how improvement 
in perceived disclosure quality affects factor loading uncertainty. The setting 
of internal control weakness, compared with the one of financial restatement, 
has both advantages and disadvantages. The advantage lies in the fact that 
disclosure of internal control weakness and/or remediation is not confounded 
by any change in financial reporting, thus making it a cleaner quasi-
experiment. In addition, the announcements of ICW and the remediation have 
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opposite effects on perceived disclosure quality, and examining both events 
will allow us to tease out competing explanations. The disadvantage emerges 
because internal control weakness is less severe compared with corporate 
misreporting, potentially reducing the power of the test and tending to bias 
against finding any significant results in the analysis. As such, our ICW results 
complement the evidence in financial restatements. 
Following the literature, we retrieve from AuditAnalytics information on 
firms' internal control effectiveness. As required by the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
enacted in July 2002, Section 302 requires a firm's CEO and CFO to certify 
their evaluation and conclusion about the firm's internal control effectiveness 
in periodic SEC filings. In addition, Section 404 requires a firm's annual report 
to contain an internal control report, including an assessment of the firm's 
internal control weakness. 
Consistent with Cheng, Dhaliwal and Zhang (2013), we combine the 
information of internal control effectiveness under Section 302 and Section 
404, and rely on it to identify a firm's initial filing of internal control weakness 
and the subsequent remediation, if any. Specifically, we use a firm's first filing 
of material weakness to identify its disclosure date of internal control 
weakness. After the ICW disclosure date, we choose the first filing indicating 
an effective internal control procedure to identify the ICW remediation date. 
Our data on firms' internal control effectiveness are then merged with CRSP 
and Compustat for information on share prices and firm fundamentals, 
respectively. Thereafter, for each ICW firm, we match with it a control firm 
within the same Fama-French 48 industry, and with the closest market cap at 
the end of the month before the ICW disclosure date. 
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Empirically, we estimate the following yearly model described in Eq. (8). 
Such a model differs from our approach in financial restatement analysis 
because here we also divide the post-ICW era into two sub-periods, 
conditional on whether firms have repaired their internal control weakness. A 
year-to-year comparison of the ICW effect thus becomes a more applicable 
approach. 
BETA_VARi,t+1 = a0 + a1ICWi + a2LOGMCAPi,t + a3MTBi,t + a4LEVi,t  
                            + a5ROAi,t + a6STDROAi,t + Industry Effects 
                            + Year Effects + ei,t+1,                                                      (8) 
 
where ICW is an indicator that equals one for the firm disclosing internal 
control weakness and zero for the control firm. The dependent variable is 
factor loading uncertainty estimated during different event years (Year -1, 
Year 1, Year 2 and Year 3, respectively). Other variables are as previously 
defined. 
Empirical results are tabulated in Table 6. Panel A shows the results by the 
event year. We observe that, in the year before the ICW disclosure, the ICW 
firm’s factor loading uncertainty does not differ significantly from the control 
firm. The coefficient on ICW is positive, but insignificant (0.1736, t = 1.53). 
After the ICW disclosure, a significance difference emerges. We examine 
three years after the ICW disclosure because ICW remediation, which will be 
utilized in our next analysis, mostly occurs in year 2 and year 3. The 
coefficient on ICW is consistently positive and significant for all three years 
(0.3431, t = 2.71 in Year 1; 0.6545, t = 5.56 in Year 2; 0.2390, t = 2.81 in Year 
3). We again compare coefficients on ICW in post-event years with the 
coefficient in the pre-event year to allow a difference-in-difference 
interpretation. Untabulated results of Chow-tests suggest that the difference is 
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only significant between Year 2 and Year -1. The time series pattern of the 
magnitude of this difference suggests that the effect on factor loading 
uncertainty is moderate in Year 1, and becomes more pronounced in Year 2, 
while it reverts back in Year 3. Such a pattern is consistent with the argument 
that investors gradually recognize the financial reporting inadequateness of the 
firm from Year 1 to Year 2, and the concern is later mitigated in Year 3 
potentially because firms make attempts (e.g., ICW remediation) to overhaul 
their internal control weakness. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
4.6.2 ICW remediation and factor loading uncertainty 
Firms disclosing internal control weakness can remediate the 
ineffectiveness after the disclosure. This improvement represents another 
event that will change investors’ perceptions of the firm’s financial reporting 
quality. Examining the change in factor loading uncertainty after the ICW 
remediation will provide additional insights into how financial reporting 
quality affects a firm’s factor loading uncertainty. 
Empirically, in Year 2 and Year 3,
 
we categorize ICW firms based on 
whether they have announced the remediation before the event year.
5
 The 
group of ‘No Remediation’ contains ICW firms that have not completed the 
remediation, and their control firms. Conversely, the group of ‘Remediation’ 
contains firms that have completed remediation, and their control firms. We 
then examine the difference in factor loading uncertainty between the ICW 
firm and the control firm again. Results in Year 2 suggest that while the 
                                                          
5
 We look at only Year 2 and Year 3 because, by construction, there is no ICW firm in Year 1 
that has completed the remediation before the event-year. 
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difference is smaller in magnitude for ICW firms that have completed the 
remediation, it remains positive and significant. However, the contrast 
becomes more pronounced in Year 3. We observe that the difference in factor 
loading uncertainty becomes insignificant after the remediation, while it 
remains positive and significant for firms that have not completed the 
remediation. Taken together, results suggest that, after the ICW remediation, 
investors’ perceived loading uncertainty decreases. Such a reduction again 
occurs gradually as it becomes most pronounced in Year 3. 
Our analyses so far have suggested a consistent and robust negative 
association between accounting quality and factor loading uncertainty. We 
now turn to investigate the return implication of this mechanism. As proposed 
in Armstrong, Banerjee and Corona (2013), a firm’s expected return decreases 
in factor loading uncertainty, controlling for the level of factor loading. We 
thus expect that a firm’s expected return increases in accounting quality 
through the channel of factor loading uncertainty, all else being equal. Our 
subsequent analyses in Section 4.7 attempt to investigate this hypothesis. 
4.7 Accounting quality, factor loading uncertainty, and expected stock 
returns – path analysis 
4.7.1 Introduction of path analysis 
To examine how accounting quality affects expected stock returns, we 
employ the technique of path analysis. More importantly, such a procedure 
allows us to investigate the extent to which such an effect, if any, is mediated 
through the channel of factor loading uncertainty. 
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As a common empirical tool in mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013), path 
analysis is a statistical model designed to answer the question of how some 
source variable X (e.g., accounting quality) can affect the outcome variable Y 
(e.g., expected stock return). What are the underlying mechanisms? How does 
each of the mechanism mediate the ultimate effect on the outcome variable? 
By decomposing the effect of X on Y into mediated effects (e.g., through beta 
or factor loading uncertainty, called mediators) and residual effects, the path 
analysis allows us to estimate the proportion of the effect that is accounted for 
by each channel.  
Empirically, there are two stages of estimation in path analysis. In the first 
stage, we will investigate the impact of the source variable (e.g., accounting 
quality) on mediators (e.g., beta and factor loading uncertainty). In the second 
stage, we estimate the effects of mediators on the outcome variable (e.g., 
expected stock return). The source variable is also included as an independent 
variable in the second stage to examine any residual/direct effect on the 
outcome variable. 
Path analysis is rooted and commonly employed in marketing and 
psychology research (Hayes, 2013), and has been recently utilized in 
accounting research. For example, Bushee and Noe (2000) conduct path 
analysis to investigate how disclosure quality can affect stock return volatility 
through attracting different groups of institutional investors. In a more recent 
study, Bhattacharya, Ecker, Olsson and Schipper (2012) employ this approach 
to seek an understanding of the direct and indirect effects of earnings quality 
on the cost of capital. 
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4.7.2 Application of path analysis 
In applying the path analysis, we incorporate two mediators based on 
theoretical grounds. Specifically, we view factor loading uncertainty as our 
interested mediator through which accounting quality can affect expected 
stock returns. Along with it, we also treat BETA as another mediator in parallel. 
In doing so, we are employing the Parallel Multiple Mediators Model outlined 
in Hayes (2013). Drawing the path diagram requires pathway coefficients 
estimated in both stages. In the first stage, we run Fama-Macbeth monthly 
regressions to estimate the effect of accounting quality on the two mediators, 
factor loading uncertainty and BETA (E.q. [9.1] and Eq. [9.2]).
6
 In the second 
stage, we again utilize a Fama-Macbeth approach to estimate the effect of 
factor loading uncertainty, BETA, and accounting quality on expected stock 
returns (E.q. [9.3]). We control loadings on the other three factors, i.e., Small-
minus-Big, High-minus-LOW, and momentum factors. In addition, we include 
a vector of firm characteristics as additional independent variables following 
Armstrong, Banerjee and Corona (2013). In both stages, we utilize the decile 




Stage 1 – Accounting quality on mediators: 
 
BETA_VARi,t+1 = a0 + a1Rank(AQ)i + a3LOGMCAPi,t + a3MTBi  
                            + a4LEVi,t + a5ROAi,t + a6STDROAi,t 
                            + Industry Effects + ei,t+1,                                         (9.1) 
 
BETAi,t+1 = a0 + a1Rank(AQ)i + a3LOGMCAPi,t + a3MTBi + a4LEVi,t  
                   + a5ROAi,t + a6STDROAi,t + Industry Effects + ei,t+1,        (9.2) 
                                                          
6
 Eq. (1) has been adopted previously in our analyses in Table 2. The only difference here is 
that we need to estimate monthly Fama-Macbeth regression to ensure consistency between the 
two stages. 
7
 Using raw measure of accounting quality yields results that are qualitatively similar. 
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Stage 2 – Mediators on expected stock returns: 
 
ri,t+1 – rf,t = α0 + a1*BETA_VARi,t + a2*BETAi,t
 
 + a3*Rank(AQ)i,t  
                   + Controlsi,t + µi,t+1,                                                           (9.3) 
                                                                   
We report results in Table 7. In Panel A, results of the first stage 
estimation suggest that higher accounting quality is associated with both lower 
factor loading uncertainty and lower BETA (-0.01440, t = -4.56 for 
BETA_VAR; -0.03479, t = -10.65 for BETA). In Panel B, results of the second 
stage estimation suggest that higher factor loading uncertainty is associated 
with lower expected stock return (-0.01659, t = -4.16). However, the 
coefficient on BETA is positive, but insignificant (0.00012, t = 0.18). The 
insignificant result is indeed consistent with empirical evidence in existing 
literature (Fama and French, 1992; Core, Guay and Verdi, 2008). Finally, the 
positive and significant coefficient on Rank(AQ) suggests a residual effect, and 
implies that worse accounting quality is associated with lower stock returns 
even after controlling for the two proposed mediators. 
To put the results into an economic perspective, we draw a path diagram 
based on estimated path coefficients of the three pathways (Fig. 1). First, 
accounting quality affects factor loading uncertainty which further affects 
expected stock returns. The effect through this pathway is estimated to be 
0.000239 (=-0.01440*-0.01659), suggesting that lower accounting quality is 
translated into lower expected stock return through the channel of factor 
loading uncertainty. Second, accounting quality affects CAPM beta, which 
further affects expected stock returns (Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2007). 
The effect of accounting quality on expected stock return is significantly lower 
in magnitude, -0.000004 (=-0.03479*0.00012), compared with that of the first 
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pathway. Furthermore, effects through these two channels are also opposite to 
each other. Finally, the residual effect is estimated to be 0.000390. Taken 
together, these three pathways suggest an unconditional effect (0.000625) in 
which lower accounting quality leads to lower expected stock returns, and the 
channel of factor loading uncertainty incorporates around 38.24% of this effect. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
4.8 Robustness analyses 
4.8.1 Alternative measures of accounting quality 
In the main analyses, we measure accounting quality as the standard 
deviation of the residual accruals estimated from Eq. (1). Such a construct 
captures the volatility of current accruals that cannot be mapped to past, 
current, and future cash flows. It has also been widely employed in recent 
literature on accounting quality (Francis, Lafond, Olsson and Schipper, 2005; 
Core, Guay and Verdi, 2008; Brousseau and Gu, 2012).  
Notwithstanding the merits of this proxy, we provide supplemental 
analyses in this section using two alternative measures of accounting quality: 
(1) the squared term of the discretionary accruals estimated from the modified 
Jones model; and (2) the squared term of the discretionary accruals estimated 
from the performance-matched accruals model (Kothari, Leone and Wasley, 
2005).
8
 For the modified Jones model, we estimate the following specification 
for each industry-year: 
                                                          
8
 We adopt the squared term of the discretionary accruals following Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam (2011). Alternatively, we also use the absolute values of discretionary accruals 
to proxy accounting quality. Results are qualitatively similar. 
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⊿TAit/ATit-1 = a0(1/ATit-1)+a1((⊿REVit -⊿ARit)/ATit-1)+a2(PPEit/ATit-1)+εit,     (10)                                                                           
 
where TA is total accruals, measured as total current accruals (TCA) minus 
depreciation and amortization (DP); AT is total asset; REV is sales revenue; 
AR is accounts receivable; and PPE is the gross value of property, plant, and 
equipment. For the performance matched model, we further add a firm’s 
profitability (ROA) into the model, and estimate the following equation: 
⊿TAit/ATit-1 = a0(1/ATit-1) + a1((⊿REVit -⊿ARit)/ATit-1 + a2(PPEit/ATit-1)  
                      + a3ROAit + εit,                                                                 (11) 
 
where ROA is measured as income before extraordinary item, deflated by total 
assets. For each of the accrual quality measures, we construct the squared term 
of the estimated discretionary accruals. We then average its value in the 
previous five years, and multiply the mean value by minus one. Consistent 
with our main AQ measure, a higher value of the accruals quality measure 
indicates higher accounting quality.  
To establish the robustness of our empirical results, we re-estimate our 
path analysis by replacing the decile rank of Dechow and Dichev accounting 
quality measure with decile ranks of accounting quality measures, estimated 
from the modified Jones model and performance matched model, respectively.  
Table 8 presents the results. In the first stage of path analysis, we examine 
the effect of accounting quality on mediators. We again find that worse 
accounting quality is associated with higher factor loading uncertainty. The 
coefficient on Rank(AQ) is negative and significant for both measures (-
0.00447, t=-4.46 for the modified-Jones measure; -0.00446, t=-4.68 for the 
performance-matched measure). In terms of its effect on CAPM beta, we find 
that worse accounting quality is associated with higher BETA, indicated by a 
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negative and significant coefficient on Rank(AQ) (-0.01175, t=-11.83 for the 
modified-Jones measure, -0.01187, t=-10.18 for the performance-matched 
measure). Such a result is also consistent with previous findings. 
In the second stage of path analysis, we estimate the effects of mediators 
on stock returns. Results suggest that the path coefficient from loading 
uncertainty to stock return remains negative and significant (-0.01683, t=-4.29 
for the modified-Jones measure; -0.01689, t=-4.30 for the performance-
matched measure). Regarding BETA, it is positive and insignificant in both 
specifications (0.00002, t=0.05 for the modified-Jones measure; 0.00003, 
t=0.04 for the performance-matched measure). The residual effect of 
accounting quality on stock return remains positive in both specifications, 
although it becomes insignificant using the modified Jones accrual quality 
measure (0.00008, t=1.08 for the modified-Jones measure; 0.00013, t=1.69 for 
the performance-matched measure). 
To summarize, empirical analyses based on the two alternative measures 
of accounting quality provide evidence that is consistent with the path diagram 
shown in Fig. 1. Specifically, worse accounting quality is associated with 
higher factor loading uncertainty and higher BETA. In turn, higher factor 
loading uncertainty is associated lower stock returns while BETA has a 
positive but insignificant effect on stock return. Our main argument is thus 
reinforced by these supplemental analyses, i.e., worse accounting quality 
lowers expected stock returns through the channel of higher factor loading 
uncertainty. 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
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4.8.2 Using raw-return CAPM instead of (log)-CAPM 
In this section, we conduct another set of robustness tests by choosing raw 
return based CAPM model as our underlying asset pricing model. Throughout 
previous analyses, we have largely relied on the log-CAPM model which has 
its theoretical appeal. However, many empirical studies have adopted an 
approach using raw returns. Evidence using raw returns will thus further 
enhance the notion that we establish in this study. 
To accommodate the alternative CAPM model, the factor loading 
uncertainty and the BETA are estimated from the following equation. 
Ri,t+1 – Rf,t = ai + bi(Rm,t+1 - Rf,t) + µi,t+1,                                           (12) 
where Ri,t+1 is the monthly return of stock i in month t+1; Rf,t is the monthly 
risk free rate; and Rm,t+1 is the monthly market return. 
We again re-estimate the path analysis under this specification. Results are 
reported in Table 9. In Panel A, we find that worse accounting quality is 
associated with higher factor loading uncertainty (-0.01300, t=-4.10) and 
higher CAPM beta (-0.02846, t=-13.49), In Panel B, results suggest that higher 
factor loading uncertainty is associated with lower stock returns (-0.00477, t=-
1.91). The coefficient on BETA remains positive, yet insignificant (0.00054, 
t=0.82). Furthermore, the residual effect of accounting quality on stock return 
is estimated to be 0.00023 (t=2.75), again indicating that higher accounting 
quality firms have higher expected stock returns. Empirical evidence here is 
thus consistent with those estimated from the log-CAPM specification. 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
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4.8.3 Alternative measure of factor loading uncertainty 
In examining the effects of accounting quality on factor loading 
uncertainty, we follow Armstrong, Banerjee and Corona (2013) and measure 
factor loading uncertainty as the squared term of the standard error of log-
CAPM beta estimated from a five-year rolling window. Such a construct, 
although intuitive, may not perfectly capture investors’ perceived uncertainty 
which is essentially unmeasurable. As a robustness analysis, we employ an 
alternative construct – the standard deviation of historical BETAs. A priori, a 
higher standard deviation implies more perceived factor loading uncertainty. 
Our dependent variable, BETA_VAR2, is measured as the standard 
deviation of firm-year level BETAs in the previous five years. An empirical 
compromise is taken as we use weekly log-returns here due to the small 
sample size each year should we still rely on monthly stock returns. We 
present our empirical results in Table 10. As we observe, the coefficient on 
AQ remains negative and significant through the three alternative empirical 
specifications (-1.6788, t = -9.14 in baseline analysis; -0.7643, t = -3.84 in firm 
fixed effects analysis; -1.2823, t = -7.22 in Fama-Macbeth analysis). In brief, 
our empirical results are consistent when we employ an alternative construct 
of factor loading uncertainty. 
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In a recent asset pricing study, Armstrong, Banerjee and Corona (2013) 
propose that higher perceived uncertainty of a firm’s factor loading is 
associated with lower expected stock return. We investigate whether worse 
accounting quality is associated with higher factor loading uncertainty. 
Establishing such a link will help us understand the mixed evidence between 
accounting quality and expected stock returns. 
We construct our accounting quality measure based on the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model. In addition, a firm’s factor loading uncertainty is 
estimated based on the (log)-CAPM model. We find consistent empirical 
evidence that worse accounting quality is associated with higher loading 
uncertainty perceived by investors. The results are robust across alternative 
specifications including pooled sample OLS regression, firm fixed effects 
analysis, and the Fama-Macbeth procedure. Such an effect becomes more 
pronounced for firms that are smaller, have more growth opportunities, have 
higher fundamental volatility and have higher analyst forecast dispersion. 
Decomposing the accounting quality measure, we find that the part determined 
by innate factors (e.g. business model and operation environment) have a 
stronger explanatory power compared with the discretionary component.  
To mitigate the measurement and causality concerns, we utilize two quasi-
experiments based on a firm’s announcement of financial restatements or its 
disclosure of internal control weakness. Both events indicate significant 
deterioration of perceived accounting quality. We find that, compared with the 
control firm, the treatment firm experienced a significant increase in factor 
loading uncertainty around the event, confirming our main hypothesis that 
worse accounting quality is associated with higher factor loading uncertainty. 
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Finally, we extend the empirical analyses to investigate the return 
implication of the loading uncertainty channel. We employ the path analysis 
technique and incorporate two potential mediators, i.e, factor loading 
uncertainty and CAPM beta. We find that worse accounting quality leads to 
lower expected return through the channel of factor loading uncertainty. In 
addition, it implies higher expected stock return through the beta effect, yet the 
return effect appears to be negligible compared with the one transmitted 
through the loading uncertainty channel. Along with the mediators, there also 
exists a residual effect of accounting quality indicating that worse accounting 
quality is associated with lower expected stock returns. Our study contributes 
to prior literature on how accounting quality is associated with expected stock 
returns (Francis, Lafond, Olsson and Schipper, 2005; Core, Guay and Verdi, 
2008; and Brousseau and Gu, 2012). We suggest a link which is overlooked in 
prior literature. Our empirical evidence suggests that such a link can help 
explain the currently mixed evidence of the association between accounting 
quality and expected stock returns. 
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Consider a set-up in which the CAMP holds and stock is priced according to 
the Gordon growth model.  Share price in the current period (Pt) and the future 





















,                           (A1.2) 
where Dt is the dividend paid in current period t; r is the discount rate 
determined by the CAMP; and g is the long term dividend growth rate.  
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Factor loading uncertainty: 
 
Without a loss of generality, we assume that a firm has a CAPM beta with a 
mean value of 1. To introduce factor loading uncertainty, we assume that the 
investors do not know the value of beta, but know that it can increase or 
decrease by ⊿ with an equal probability. That is, we have two following 
potential states: 
– [1] β = 1+Δ, Prob.=0.5 
– [2] β = 1-Δ, Prob.=0.5 
 
If Δ=0, then β = 1. In this case, there is no factor loading uncertainty, and the 
beta is known to the investors. 
If Δ>0, there is factor loading uncertainty, and a higher Δ indicates more 
uncertainty. Therefore, the magnitude of Δ indicates the extent of factor 
loading uncertainty. 
 
Factor loading uncertainty and share price: 
 













,                                               (A1.4) 
 
where β is the CAPM beta; rf is the risk free rate; and rm is the market return.  
All parameters in (A1.4) except β are known to investors at period t. 
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Two points are worthy of attention.  First, Pt is a decreasing function of β.  
Second, Pt is a convex function of β (see Fig. A1 below). It is the second 
feature that causes factor loading uncertainty to play a role.  
 
Figure A1: CAPM beta and share price 
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Since the two states occur in equal probability, share price is the expected 
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Finding 1: Stock price Pt increases in factor loading uncertainty Δ. 
 
Factor loading uncertainty and expected stock return: 
 
Combining Eq. (A1.3) and Eq. (A1.7), we can have the relation between factor 
loading uncertainty and expected stock return as follows: 
2 2
1
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E R g
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,         (A1.8) 
 
Finding 2: Expected stock return E[Rt+1] decreases in factor loading 
uncertainty Δ.  
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Appendix 2: Cash flow noise and covariance dispersion 
In the case of no uncertainty about cash flow, investors can precisely 
project future cash flows and the corresponding states of nature. Suppose, 







Future Cash Flow x x x
State of Nature y y y
 
 
A firm’s factor loading can be determined by the covariance between X and Y. 
By definition, it is: 
( , ) [ [ ]][ [ ]]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
X Y E X E X Y E Y
E XY E X E Y




And the factor loading can be known precisely. 
 
In the case of uncertainty about cash flow, we denote the stream of cash 
flows as 
i i ix x   , where (0, )N  . In this case, the perceived factor 
loading is: 
( , ) [ [ ]][ [ ]]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
X Y E X E X Y E Y
E XY E X E Y
E XY Y E X E Y E E Y
E XY Y E X E Y












The only uncertain part is:  
[ ]E Y = 1 1 2 2
* * ... *




     
(note that a linear 
combination of random normal variables still follows a normal distribution). It 
measures the potential deviation (note that [ ]E Y  is a random variable) from 
the factor loading under the no-uncertainty case. 
 
For each firm, the expected absolute value of this deviation, which captures 
the uncertainty towards the factor loading, is: 
2





 , indicating that if the future cash flow uncertainty ( ) 
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Appendix 3: Variable definitions 
Variable Definitions 
AQ The standard deviation of a firm’s accruals that are not mapped to previous, 
current and future operating cash flows in the five years leading through the 






Factor loading uncertainty, measured as the squared term of the standard error 
of the beta estimate from the log(CAPM) model using returns in the previous 
60 months; 
 
LOGRETRF The natural log of stock excess return, measured as Log(1+Return)-




Beta in log(CAPM) model using returns in the previous 60 months; 
 
LOGMCAP Natural log of market cap at the last fiscal year end; 
 
MTB Market to book ratio at the last fiscal year end; 
 
LEV Long term debt divided by total assets; 
 
ROA Income before extraordinary item divided by total assets; 
 


















Loading on momentum factor estimated using returns in the previous 60 
months; 
 





Indicator that equals one for the firm disclosing internal control weakness, and 
zero for the control firm; 
  
TURNOVER The average ratio between the number of shares traded and number of shares 
outstanding in the prior year; 
  
SPREAD The difference between daily bid and ask price, deflated by their average 
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Figure 1: Path diagram of the association between accounting quality and 
expected stock return 
This figure shows pathway coefficients in the path analysis of how accounting quality affects 
expected stock returns. The complete set of estimation results is presented in Table 7. The 
source variable is the decile rank of accounting quality measured as the standard deviation of 
accruals that cannot be mapped to previous, current and future cash flows, multiplied by 
minus one. The outcome variable is log-excess stock return, LOGRETRF, measured as the 
difference between ln(1+ret) and ln(1+rf). The two mediators are factor loading uncertainty 
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Table 1: Summary statistics and correlations of key variables 
This table reports summary statistics and correlation coefficients of the key variables. The 
sample consists of 101,283 firm-year observations over 1971 to 2011. Panel A provides the 
mean, standard deviation, first quartile, median, and third quartile of the key variables. Panel 
B presents pearson correlations of the key variables. See Appendix 3 for complete variable 
definitions. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std Q1 MEDIAN Q3 
AQ -0.050 0.043 -0.063 -0.037 -0.022 
BETA_VAR 0.222 0.326 0.061 0.123 0.257 
BETA 1.192 0.729 0.737 1.125 1.562 
LOGMCAP 4.743 2.260 3.034 4.581 6.328 
MTB 2.334 3.178 0.883 1.536 2.722 
LEV 0.168 0.163 0.018 0.137 0.262 
ROA -0.005 0.192 -0.005 0.042 0.079 
STDROA 0.085 0.139 0.019 0.038 0.087 
 
Panel B: Pearson correlations 
Variables   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
AQ (1) 1.00        
          BETA_VAR (2) -0.40 1.00       
BETA (3) -0.13 0.16 1.00      
LOGMCAP (4) 0.25 -0.22 0.04 1.00     
MTB (5) -0.17 0.15 0.07 0.24 1.00    
LEV (6) 0.11 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 -0.08 1.00   
ROA (7) 0.39 -0.34 -0.16 0.22 -0.12 -0.01 1.00  
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Table 2: Accounting quality and factor loading uncertainty 
This table reports results of the association between accounting quality and factor loading 
uncertainty. The sample consists of 101,283 firm-year observations over 1971 to 2011. The 
dependent variable is factor loading uncertainty estimated from a rolling-window of 60 
months before the January of year t. AQ is the standard deviation of the residual accruals in 
previous five years leading to the latest fiscal year end before January of year t, multiplied by 
minus one. Panel A presents coefficient estimates from the baseline OLS regression. Panel B 
provides estimation results from OLS regression with firm fixed effects and Fama-Macbeth 
regression. In both panels, industries are defined by the Fama-French 48 classifications. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. In OLS regressions, standard errors (in parentheses) are 
heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. In the Fama-Macbeth regression, 
standard errors are computed following Newey-West (1987). *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix 3 for complete 
variable definitions. 
 




















Industry Effects YES 






Panel B: Robustness – firm fixed effects and Fama-Macbeth estimation 
VARIABLES (1) Firm Fixed Effects (2) Fama-Macbeth 
AQ -0.5628 -0.7815 
 
(-7.99)*** (-7.19)*** 
LOGMCAP -0.0139 -0.0330 
 
(-7.36)*** (-7.89)*** 
MTB 0.0040 0.0074 
 
(6.94)*** (9.29)*** 
LEV 0.0197 0.0248 
 
(1.79)* (2.46)** 
ROA 0.0302 -0.0544 
 
(2.15)** (-2.34)** 
STDROA 0.3953 0.5535 
 
(14.14)*** (11.84)*** 
Industry Effects - Yes 
Firm Effects YES - 
Year Effects YES - 
OBS (Median) 101,283 2,497 
Adj. R
2
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Table 3: Accounting quality and factor loading uncertainty – conditional 
on the firm’s information environment 
This table reports results of the association between accounting quality and factor loading 
uncertainty conditional on the firm’s information environment. The sample consists of 
101,283 firm-year observations over 1971 to 2011. Sample size is reduced to 16,260 when 
analyst forecast data is required from I/B/E/S. DSIZE equals one for firms with market cap 
that is higher than its yearly median and zero otherwise; DMTB equals one for firms with 
market to book ratio that is higher than its yearly median and zero otherwise; DSTDROA 
equals one for firms with standard deviation of ROA that is higher than its yearly median and 
zero otherwise; DDISP equals one for firms with analyst forecast dispersion (DISP) that is 
higher than its yearly median and zero otherwise. DISP is constructed as the standard 
deviation of analysts’ forecasts of annual earnings, deflated by the share price at the fiscal year 
end. Industries are defined by the Fama-French 48 classifications. t-statistics reported in 
parentheses are based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the 
firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. See 
Appendix 3 for complete variable definitions. 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AQ -1.0126 -0.6151 -0.2213 -0.5702 
 
(-13.74)*** (-8.45)*** (-3.25)*** (-6.37)*** 
AQ*DSIZE 0.3347 
   
 
(4.73)*** 










   
(-12.49)*** 
 AQ*DDISP 
   
-0.1503 
    
(-1.74)* 
LOGMCAP -0.0309 -0.0348 -0.0326 -0.0334 
 
(-32.44)*** (-40.32)*** (-39.02)*** (-28.87)*** 
MTB 0.0067 0.0039 0.0064 0.0031 
 
(11.24)*** (6.92)*** (10.74)*** (5.00)*** 
LEV 0.0031 0.0029 0.0021 -0.0311 
 
(0.33) (0.30) (0.22) (-2.83)*** 
ROA -0.1055 -0.1195 -0.1039 -0.0418 
 
(-6.90)*** (-7.78)*** (-6.81)*** (-2.07)** 
STDROA 0.5447 0.5342 0.4874 0.4837 
 
(19.76)*** (19.40)*** (16.49)*** (11.14)*** 
DISP 
   
-0.0002 
    
(-0.81) 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 101,283 101,283 101,283 16,260 
Adj. R
2
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Table 4: Innate versus discretionary accounting quality 
This table reports results of the association between innate (discretionary) accounting quality 
and factor loading uncertainty. The sample consists of 87,979 firm-year observations over 
1971 to 2011. Sample size is reduced due to the requirement of additional variables in 
constructing the two components of accounting quality. To estimate the innate and 
discretionary components of accounting quality, we estimate the following annual regression: 
AQi,t = a0 + a1*LOGATi,t + a2*STDCFOi,t + a3*STDSALEi,t + a4*OPCyclei,t  
           + a5*LOSSi,t + εi,t; (4) 
where LOGAT is the natural log of the firm’s total assets; STDCFO is the standard deviation 
of the firm’s cash flow from operations in the previous 10 years; STDSALE is the standard 
deviation of the firm’s sales in previous 10 years; OPCycle measures the length of the 
operating cycle and is defined as 360/(Sale/Average Account Receivable) + 360/(Cost of 
Goods Sold/Average Inventory); finally, LOSS is defined as the proportion of annual earnings 
that are negative in previous 10 years. We define a firm’s innate accounting quality 
(AQ_INNATE) as the predicted value from estimating Equation (4), and define a firm’s 
discretionary accounting quality (AQ_DISC) as the residual. We then estimate the following 
regression model and report results in Column (1): 
BETA_VARi,t+1 = a0 + a1AQ_INNATEi,t + a2AQ_DISCi,t + a2LOGMCAPi,t + a3LEVi,t  
                           + a4ROAi,t + a5STDROAi,t + Industry Effects + Year Effects + ei,t+1, (5) 
Alternatively, we take decile ranks of both components and replace AQ_INNATE (AQ_DISC) 
with AQRANK_INNATE (AQRANK_DISC) and report results in Column (2). Industries are 
defined by the Fama-French 48 classifications. t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. F-test results 
of the difference in coefficients on the innate accounting quality and the discretionary 
accounting quality are provided in the bottom row. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix 3 for complete variable definitions. 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
AQ_INNATE -3.2847 - 
 
(-15.81)*** - 
AQ_DISC -0.5756 - 
 
(-7.25)*** - 
AQRANK_INNATE - -0.0211 
 
- (-21.43)*** 
AQRANK_DISC - -0.0028 
 
- (-5.40)*** 
LOGMCAP -0.0137 -0.0171 
 
(-8.81)*** (-14.98)*** 
MTB 0.0036 0.0052 
 
(4.99)*** (7.35)*** 
LEV 0.0355 0.0181 
 
(3.59)*** (1.82)* 
ROA -0.0476 -0.0797 
 
(-2.47)** (-4.09)*** 
STDROA 0.4462 0.6697 
 
(9.77)*** (16.20)*** 
Industry Effects YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES 
Observations 87,979 87,979 
Adj. R
2
 0.42 0.40 
Difference in coefficients on innate and 
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Table 5: Financial restatements and factor loading uncertainty 
This table reports the effect of financial restatements on firms’ factor loading uncertainties. 
We utilize the restatement sample provided by the GAO report. After merging with Compustat 
and CRSP to construct required variables, our restatement sample consists of 1,030 restating 
firms with restatements announced over 1997 to 2006. For each restating firm, we match with 
it a non-restating firm in the same Fama-French 48 industry, and with the closest market cap at 
the end of the month before the restatement announcement month. We then estimate factor 
loading uncertainties for both the restating firm and the control firm in two 12 months’ periods 
before the restatement month (Year -1) and after the restatement month (Year 1), respectively. 
Panel A provides univariate t-tests of the difference in average factor loading uncertainties for 
both restating firms and control firms before and after the restatement announcement, and 
their differences in the change. Panel B conducts multivariate difference-in-difference 
analyses. RESTATE is coded as one for the restating firm, and zero for the control firm. POST 
is coded as one for the post-restatement year, and zero for the pre-restatement year for both the 
restating firm and the control firm. Industries are defined by the Fama-French 48 
classifications. t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors that are 
heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by firm. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix 3 for complete variable definitions. 
 
Panel A: Univariate t-tests 
Group Pre Post Dif 
Restatement Firm 1.7761 2.4436 0.6675 
   
(4.81)*** 
Control Firm 1.5282 1.7681 0.2399 




      (2.38)*** 
 
Panel B: Factor loading uncertainty around the financial restatement 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
POST -0.0488 - 
 
(-0.51) - 
RESTATE 0.1282 - 
 
(1.28) - 
POST*RESTATE 0.5755 0.6335 
 
(3.91)*** (3.93)*** 
LOGMCAP -0.3017 0.0879 
 
(-9.64)*** (0.33) 
MTB 0.0004 -0.0000 
 
(0.66) (-0.02) 
LEV 0.1162 0.2751 
 
(0.39) (0.40) 
ROA -0.6664 -0.9282 
 
(-1.74)* (-1.46) 
STDROA 2.8778 -0.7463 
 
(6.60)*** (-0.48) 
CONSTANT 3.1689 1.9760 
 
(10.61)*** (1.28) 
Year Effects YES YES 
Industry Effects YES NO 
Firm Effects NO YES 
Observations 4,120 4,120 
Adj. R
2








Table 6: Internal control weakness and factor loading uncertainty 
This table presents results of whether firms’ factor loading uncertainty changes around 
disclosures of internal control weakness and remediation. We identify firms’ internal control 
effectiveness based on information of internal control effectiveness under Section 302 and 
Section 404, collected from the Audit Analytics database. For each restating firm, we match 
with it a non-restating firm in the same Fama-French 48 industry, with the most similar market 
cap at the end of the month before the ICW disclosure month. We then estimate factor loading 
uncertainties for both the ICW firm and the control firm in the year before the ICW disclosure 
month (Year -1) and first year (Year 1), second year (Year 2) and third year (Year 3) after the 
ICW disclosure month. The dependent variable is factor loading uncertainty estimated from 
each corresponding 12 month periods. The variable ICW is an indicator that equals one for 
firms disclosing internal control weakness and zero for control firms. Panel A presents yearly 
estimation results of whether ICW firms have higher factor loading uncertainty before and 
after the ICW disclosure. Panel B presents results of whether the higher factor loading 
uncertainty of ICW firms disappear disappears after the ICW remediation. Industries are 
defined by the Fama-French 48 classifications. t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix 3 for 
complete variable definitions. 
 
Panel A: ICW disclosure and factor loading uncertainty 
 
  Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ICW 0.1736 0.3431 0.6545 0.2390 
 
(1.53) (2.71)*** (5.56)*** (2.81)*** 
LOGMCAP -0.4593 -0.4749 -0.3423 -0.2182 
 
(-10.98)*** (-10.37)*** (-9.76)*** (-8.76)*** 
MTB 0.0007 0.0012 0.0007 0.0003 
 
(4.38)*** (6.29)*** (3.35)*** (2.64)*** 
LEV -0.2379 -0.0946 1.1493 0.1251 
 
(-0.78) (-0.30) (2.26)** (0.42) 
ROA -1.9392 -2.7781 -1.6955 -0.8172 
 
(-5.16)*** (-6.26)*** (-3.53)*** (-2.92)*** 
STDROA 0.6685 0.3055 0.7646 0.2845 
 
(2.86)*** (1.58) (2.14)** (2.05)** 
CONSTANT 3.5004 3.0305 1.6941 1.7772 
 
(8.19)*** (7.82)*** (6.48)*** (6.16)*** 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,568 2,568 2,250 1,920 
Adj. R
2
 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.19 
     
Panel B: Remediation and factor loading uncertainty 
 
  Year 2   Year 3 
VARIABLES No Remediation Remediation   No Remediation Remediation 



















































Industry Effects YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES 
 
YES YES 




















































Table 7: Accounting quality, factor loading uncertainty, and expected 
stock returns – path analysis 
This table reports the path analysis results of the association between accounting quality and 
expected stock returns. Identifying BETA_VAR and BETA as two potential mediators, we 
estimate how accounting quality affects expected stock returns through these two mediators. 
In the first stage, we estimate the effect of accounting quality on BETA_VAR and BETA, 
respectively, and report results in Panel A. In the second stage, we estimate the effect of 
Rank(AQ), BETA_VAR and BETA on expected stock returns, controlling other determinants of 
firms’ expected stock returns. We report the second stage results in Panel B. In both panels, 
we estimate Fama-Macbeth regression with each month representing a cross-section. Based on 
the estimation results, we then draw the path diagram in Figure 1. Rank(AQ) is the decile rank 
of our accounting quality measure. Standard errors are computed following Newey-West 
(1987). *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. See 
Appendix 3 for complete variable definitions. 
 
Panel A: The effects of accounting quality  
on mediators   
Panel B: The effects of mediators 
on stock return 
VARIABLES BETA_VAR BETA 
 
VARIABLES LOGRETRF 
Rank(AQ) -0.01440 -0.03479 
 
Rank(AQ) 0.00039 
 (-4.56)*** (-10.65)*** 
 
 (3.91)*** 
LOGMCAP -0.03329 0.02362 
 
BETA_VAR -0.01659 
 (-6.64)*** (1.76)* 
 
 (-4.16)*** 
MTB 0.00604 0.00194 
 
BETA 0.00012 
 (1.27) (1.25) 
  
(0.18) 
LEV 0.01882 0.30007 
 
LOADSMB 0.00039 
 (1.85)* (3.38)*** 
 
 (0.69) 
ROA -0.22536 -0.11748 
 
LOADHML 0.00096 
 (-1.83)* (-2.20)** 
 
 (1.84)* 







Industry Effects YES YES LOGMCAP -0.00021 
Months 556 556 
 
 (-0.51) 





 0.35 0.19 
 
 (-1.69)* 
    
TURNOVER -0.00215 
    
 (-5.57)*** 
    
SPREAD -0.02502 
    
 (-2.99)*** 
    
LEV -0.00380 
    
 (-1.55) 
    
ROA 0.02633 
    
 (4.28)*** 
    
STDROA -0.00984 
    
 (-2.46)** 




Median OBS 2630.5 

















Table 8: Robustness - path analysis using alternative accounting quality 
measures 
This table reports the path analysis results of the association between accounting quality and 
expected stock returns using alternative measures of accounting quality. The first measure is 
the squared term of discretionary accrual from the modified Jones model, taken previous five 
years’ average. The second measure is the squared term of discretionary accrual from 
performance-matched Jones model (Kothari, Leone and Wasley, 2005), taken previous five 
years’ average. Identifying BETA_VAR and BETA as two potential mediators, we estimate 
how accounting quality affects expected stock returns through these two mediators. In the first 
stage, we estimate the effect of accounting quality on BETA_VAR and BETA, respectively, and 
report results in Panel A. In the second stage, we estimate the effect of Rank(AQ), BETA_VAR 
and BETA on expected stock returns, controlling other determinants of firms’ expected stock 
returns. We report the second stage results in Panel B. In both panels, we estimate Fama-
Macbeth regression with each month representing a cross-section. Rank(AQ) is the decile rank 
of our accounting quality measure. Standard errors are computed following Newey-West 
(1987). *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. See 
Appendix 3 for complete variable definitions. 
 
Panel A: The effects of accounting quality on mediators 
 
  Modifed Jones   Performance Matched 
VARIABLES BETA_VAR BETA   BETA_VAR BETA 
Rank(AQ) -0.00447 -0.01175 
 
-0.00446 -0.01187 
 (-4.46)*** (-11.83)*** 
 
(-4.68)*** (-10.18)*** 
LOGMCAP -0.03888 0.01044 
 
-0.03879 0.01065 
 (-6.63)*** (0.75) 
 
(-6.33)*** (0.77) 
MTB 0.00619 0.00251 
 
0.00619 0.00252 
 (1.28) (1.39) 
 
(1.28) (1.37) 
LEV 0.01381 0.28763 
 
0.01346 0.28712 
 (1.35) (3.13)*** 
 
(1.31) (3.12)*** 
ROA -0.22971 -0.13190 
 
-0.22849 -0.12485 
 (-1.89)* (-2.50)** 
 
(-1.89)* (-2.25)** 







Industry Effects YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Months 556 556 
 
556 556 





 0.33 0.18  0.33 0.18 
 
Panel B: The effects of mediators on stock return 
 
VARIABLES Modified Jones Performance Matched 
Rank(AQ) 0.00008 0.00013 
 (1.08) (1.69)* 
BETA_VAR -0.01683 -0.01689 
 (-4.29)*** (-4.30)*** 
BETA 0.00002 0.00003 
 
(0.04) (0.05) 
LOADSMB 0.00036 0.00037 
 (0.62) (0.64) 
LOADHML 0.00098 0.00099 
 (1.89)* (1.90)* 
LOADUMD -0.00108 -0.00109 
 (-2.01)** (-2.03)** 
LOGMCAP -0.00007 -0.00009 
 (-0.17) (-0.21) 
MTB -0.00029 -0.00028 
 (-1.78)* (-1.76)* 
TURNOVER -0.00222 -0.00221 
57 
 
 (-5.61)*** (-5.63)*** 
SPREAD -0.02717 -0.02680 
 (-3.21)*** (-3.18)*** 
LEV -0.00328 -0.00335 
 (-1.32) (-1.36) 
ROA 0.02631 0.02634 
 (4.24)*** (4.22)*** 
STDROA -0.01198 -0.01192 
 (-2.81)*** (-2.81)*** 
Months 556 556 
Median OBS 2630.5 2630.5 
Median Adj R
2











































Table 9: Robustness - path analysis based on raw stock returns 
This table reports the path analysis results of the association between accounting quality and 
expected stock returns using raw-return CAPM model as the underlying asset pricing model. 
Identifying BETA_VAR and BETA as two potential mediators, we estimate how accounting 
quality affects expected stock returns through these two mediators. Both BETA_VAR and 
BETA are estimated from the raw-return CAPM model. In the first stage, we estimate the 
effect of accounting quality on BETA_VAR and BETA, respectively, and report results in Panel 
A. In the second stage, we estimate the effect of Rank(AQ), BETA_VAR and BETA on 
expected stock returns, controlling other determinants of firms’ expected stock returns. We 
report the second stage results in Panel B. In both panels, we estimate Fama-Macbeth 
regression with each month representing a cross-section. Rank(AQ) is the decile rank of our 
accounting quality measure. Standard errors are computed following Newey-West (1987). *, 
** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix 3 
for complete variable definitions. 
 
Panel A: The effects of accounting quality  
on mediators 
 
Panel B: The effects of  
mediators on stock return 
VARIABLES BETA_VAR BETA 
 
VARIABLES LOGRETRF 
Rank(AQ) -0.01300 -0.02846 
 
Rank(AQ) 0.00023 
 (-4.10)*** (-13.49)*** 
 
 (2.75)*** 
LOGMCAP -0.04616 0.02787 
 
BETA_VAR -0.00477 
 (-6.65)*** (1.95)* 
 
 (-1.91)* 
MTB 0.01704 0.00503 
 
BETA 0.00054 
 (2.63)*** (1.76)* 
  
(0.82) 
LEV -0.03275 0.31810 
 
LOADSMB -0.00005 
 (-0.93) (3.23)*** 
 
 (-0.09) 
ROA -0.41535 -0.11022 
 
LOADHML 0.00062 
 (-2.28)** (-1.10) 
 
 (1.25) 







Months 556 556 
 
LOGMCAP -0.00091 





 0.25 0.19 
 
MTB -0.00031 
    
 (-1.65)* 
    
TURNOVER -0.00243 
    
 (-6.40)*** 
    
SPREAD 0.03467 
    
 (2.95)*** 
    
LEV -0.00244 
    
 (-0.95) 
    
ROA 0.02169 
    
 (3.60)*** 
    
STDROA 0.00143 
     
(0.36) 
    
Months 556 
    
Median OBS 2630.5 

















Table 10: Robustness - an alternative construct of factor loading 
uncertainty 
This table reports the results of the association between accounting quality and factor loading 
uncertainty using an alternative construct of the latter. The dependent variable, BETA_VAR2, 
is defined as the squared term of the standard deviation of log-CAPM beta separately 
estimated in previous five years. The log-CAPM model here relies on weekly log-returns to 
ensure sufficient number of observations in each regression. Column “Baseline” reports 
baseline analysis results. Column “Firm F.E.” reports results with firm fixed effects. Column 
“F-M” reports results of Fama-Macbeth analysis in which observations in each year serve as 
one cross-section. In the Fama-Macbeth regression, standard errors are computed following 
Newey-West (1987). *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. See Appendix 3 for complete variable definitions. 
 
VARIABLES Baseline Firm F.E. F-M 
AQ -1.6788 -0.7643 -1.2823 
 
(-9.14)*** (-3.84)*** (-7.22)*** 
LOGMCAP -0.0696 -0.0487 -0.0669 
 
(-25.98)*** (-8.12)*** (-6.38)*** 
MTB 0.0137 0.0060 0.0147 
 
(8.00)*** (3.06)*** (6.33)*** 
LEV -0.0511 -0.0198 -0.0006 
 
(-1.75)* (-0.57) (-0.03) 
ROA -0.2261 0.0274 -0.1102 
 
(-5.69)*** (0.72) (-2.87)*** 
STDROA 0.7868 0.3646 0.9435 
 
(11.90)*** (2.71)*** (8.60)*** 
Constant 0.5023 0.5617 0.6318 
 
(28.42)*** (21.65)*** (5.08)*** 
Year Effects YES YES - 
Industry Effects YES - YES 
Firm Effects NO YES NO 
Observations 96,771 96,771 2396 
Years - - 41 
Adj. R
2
 0.21 0.52 0.20 
 
